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Abstract 
 
Rising urban and environmental demand for water has created growing pressure to re-allocate 
water from traditional agricultural uses.  The evolution of  water markets  has been  more 
complicated than those for other resources. In this paper, we first explain these differences by 
examining water rights and regulatory issues.  Second, we place our research in the context of 
the economics literature on water marketing. Third, w e present new, comprehensive data on 
prices and the extent, nature, and timing of water transfers across 12 western states from 1987-
2005. We find that p rices are higher for agriculture-to-urban trades versus within-agriculture 
trades, in part, reflecting the differences in marginal values between the two uses.  Prices for 
urban use are also growing relative to agricultural use. Markets are responding in that the number 
of agriculture-to-urban transactions is rising, whereas the number of agriculture-to-agriculture 
transfers is not. Further, there is a shift from using short-term leases to using multi-year leases of 
water and permanent sales of water rights.  This pattern  underscores the need to consider the 
amounts of water obligated over time, rather than examining only annual flows in assessing the 
quantities of water traded as is the common practice in the literature.  Considering water 
obligated over time, termed committed water, we find significantly more is transferred and the 
direction of trading is different than if the focus is on annual flows. Finally, the data reveal 
considerable variation in water trading across the states. 
 
I. Introduction. 
Farmers in the American West use roughly 80 percent of the region’s water, often in low-
value or subsidized crops, such as alfalfa, cotton, or rice. Farmers typically pay only for the 
pumping or conveyance costs for the water and not for its scarcity value.1 Accordingly, much 
water use in agriculture has less value than if it were used in the West’s rapidly growing urban 
areas and in many environmental and recreational uses. As a result, significant allocative gains 
arise if some water is moved from agriculture to other sectors.    
For example, in 1992, Ronald Griffin and Fred Boadu reported that the value of water 
used in agriculture, capitalized over 50 years, was $300 to $2,300 per acre-foot (af), 
(approximately 326,000 gallons) in the Rio Grande Valley of Texas. In contrast, urban water 
values, capitalized over the same period, ranged from $6,500 to $21,000 per acre-foot. Griffin 
and Boadu estimated that the average re-allocation of water produced net benefits of $10,000 per 
                                                  
1 Glennon ( 2005,1883-85). As pointed out by Hanemann (2005, note 29), this also is historically true for urban 
areas where metering did not become common until well into the 20th century. 
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acre-foot.2  For more contemporary evidence, in California, an acre-foot used in the 
semiconductor industry produces $980,000 in gross state revenue; that same acre-foot used to 
grow cotton and alfalfa generates $60.
3 Groundwater for farming near Marana, Pima County, 
Arizona costs approximately $27 per acre-foot, whereas the same water supplied by Tucson 
Water, with an increasing block rate structure, will cost customers from $479 to $3,267 per acre-
foot.
4 In recent efforts to secure water from southeastern California’s Imperial Irrigation District 
(IID), San Diego offered $225 per acre-foot for water that IID farmers paid $15.50.5  Even more 
dramatically, IID farmers paid $13.50 per acre-foot in 2001, while a development near the South 
Rim of Grand Canyon National Park was prepared to spend $20,000 per acre-foot to deliver the 
same Colorado River water.
6 Although the costs of treating and distributing water for urban 
residents tend to be far greater than for rural and explain some of these price differences, the size 
of the differentials indicate the higher marginal benefits received by many urban versus rural 
users for water.   
These disparities in the value of water have occasioned calls for re-allocation of water 
from lower-value to higher-value activities through water marketing. Such trades can benefit 
both parties: farmers receive more for their water than they could earn in agriculture; and cities
7 
                                                  
2 Griffin and Boadu (1992, 274-5).  
 
3 See Peter Gleick, Pending Deal Would Undermine State’s Water Solutions, Sacramento Bee, Feb. 25, 2005, at B7.  
There are other inputs in production, of course, but this example demonstrates the potential marginal gains possible 
from water re-allocation. 
  
4 Based on personal communication with Paul Wilson, professor of agricultural economics at the University of 
Arizona; Ken Seasholes, director of the Arizona Department of Water Resources, Tucson Active Management Area; 
and Christopher Avery, Esq., Tucson City Attorney’s Office.  See Tucson City Code § 27-33.  
 
5 Dean E. Murphy, “Pact in West will Send Farms’ Water to Cities, New York Times.com , October 17, 2003. 
 
6 See Glennon, Water Follies (2002, 207). 
 
7 This analysis applies as well to securing water for environmental and recreational uses. 
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secure additional water at a lower cost than available alternatives, such as desalination. The need 
to develop water markets for the smooth, incremental transfer of water across sectors with 
minimum transaction costs has increased over the past 20 years due to brisk population growth, 
urbanization, increased environmental concerns, and a rise in the economic contribution of 
services simultaneous with a relative decline in agriculture. 
 As the legal summary in section II will make clear, water markets are more complex 
than markets for other resources, such as land. Property rights to water are less complete due to 
the mobile and uncertain nature of water supplies, the incomplete adjudication of water rights in 
many watersheds, and the fact that individuals have usufruct rights subject to state oversight.
8 
Further, because water rights often involve sequential users of the same water, water trades that 
change the location, nature and/or timing of use, as is the case with most agriculture-to-urban 
transfers, are regulated by the states in order to limit harm to third-parties, who might be 
adversely affected. Third-party objections to water transfers can and have slowed, limited, or 
blocked water transfers.9 Even though the interconnected nature of water rights has the potential 
to drive up transaction costs, water transfers are taking place.  
This article addresses the extent and nature of western water marketing. It documents 
trading activity, identifies the sectors and states involved, describes the contractual forms used, 
and illustrates the trends in water transactions over time.  Water markets as we define them 
involve three different types of voluntary transactions: sales of water rights, one-year (short-
term) leases, and multi-year (long-term) leases. Water transfers are affected by the timing of the 
                                                  
8 Sax (1990, 260), Gray (1994b, 262). For more detailed discussion of water rights and regulation, see Brewer, 
Glennon, Ker and Libecap (2007, forthcoming).  
 
9 We do not object to the regulation of water transfers where significant third-party effects may occur. Rather, we 
note that the regulatory process can raise transaction costs because of additional time and resources required to 
secure regulatory approval for water transfers.  Where there are important physical externalities, the added 
transaction costs, in part, reflect effort to more completely internalize those effects and thereby may reduce the 
number of water trades.   4 
transaction, location, quantity of water, and priority of water right (discussed below).  We are 
primarily interested in three types of water trades: agriculture-to-agriculture, agriculture-to-
urban, and urban-to-urban for the 12 western states. Our objective is to provide a comprehensive 
portrait of how water markets have developed in response to the price differences noted above. 
Our data reveal a number of important features regarding water markets: (1) Prices are 
higher for agriculture-to-urban trades relative to within-agriculture trades. (2) Agriculture is the 
origin of the majority of transactions. (3) The annual flow of water traded and the amount of 
water committed for transfer in a given year through long-term contracts (long-term leases and 
sales) reveal very different patterns regarding the movement of water. As measured by the 
amount of water contractually committed in a given year, the volume of water traded in the West 
is increasing over time, whereas, if measured by the annual flow of water traded, the amount is 
not rising. (4) The number of market transactions is increasing over time primarily due to 
agriculture-to-urban trades. (5) Sales and multi-year leases are growing while one-year leases are 
not. (6) Whether measured as annual flow or committed water, Arizona, California, and Texas 
are among the top four states in the quantity of water traded.10 And, (7) agriculture-to-urban 
trades involve the majority of the water moved in most states when using the committed 
measure, whereas agriculture-to-agriculture trades involve the majority of water in most states 
when using the annual flow measure.  
We report annual water transfers from 1987 through 2005 as listed in the trade journal, 
Water Strategist, a monthly publication that details transactions, litigation, legislation, and other 
water marketing activities.  Self-advertised as “the only source of published information on water 
                                                  
10 In terms of annual flow, California (11,058,161 acre-feet), Arizona (8,375,767 acre-feet), Idaho (4,960,527 acre-
feet), and Texas (2,559,140 acre-feet) are the leaders; and in terms of water committed for transfer over 19 years, 
California (36,761,948 acre-feet), Texas (31,099,884 acre -feet), Arizona (21,889,597 acre-feet), and Colorado 
(14,913,506 acre-feet) are the leaders. These committed amounts are discounted as discussed later in the text. 
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transactions in the West”,11 the Water Strategist publishes each month a “Transactions” section 
that lists, by state, each water transfer that occurred.  From the publication, we can learn all or a 
subset of the following: the year of the transfer; the acquirer and supplier of the water (both 
labeled variously as municipality, developer, company, irrigator, farmer, rancher, conservancy 
district, irrigation district, state, federal agency, etc.); the amount of water transferred; the 
proposed use of the water; and, if applicable, the terms, such as the price and nature (lease or 
sale) of the contract.  Our data set only includes transactions reported by the Water Strategist, 
and no doubt misses some transactions. These are most likely to include within-organization 
(within irrigation district) short-term trades.
12 Even so, Water Strategist listings are the most 
comprehensive available and hence, capture the general pattern of water trading.
13  
In section II, we offer an overview of water rights in the West and consider some critical 
legal and regulatory issues that affect water markets. Section III discusses issues raised in the 
economics literature that relate to water transfers while section IV addresses general data 
collection methodological issues and section V explains how we measured the volume of water 
traded using a “committed” variable.  Section VI presents price trends in western water markets 
and section VII offers an overview of the markets with data on the contractual forms used, the 
                                                  
11 www.waterstrategist.com 
 
12 Brown (2005), who also uses the Water Strategist data, points to some missing transactions.  We compared our 
California transactions drawn from the Water Strategist with those reported by Hanak (2002) for the time period 
1987-2001 for a sense of the completeness of the Water Strategist data.  Hanak reports data collected from a variety 
of primary sources including the State Water Resources Control Board, the California Department of Water 
Resources, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation as well as transfer records from within the Metropolitan Water District, 
the Westlands Water District and other major organizations.  For 1987-1996 the two data sets track closely, but for 
1996-2001, our transaction volumes are lower than hers, suggesting some under counting. We have no way of 
determining whether this problem also occurs in other western states. Nevertheless, we conclude that the Water 
Strategist data appear to be generally representative of water transactions.  
 
13 Besides Brown (2005), other authors who have used the Water Strategist include Howitt and Hansen (2005), 
Brookshire, Colby, Ewers, and Ganderton (2004), Adams, Crews, and Cummings (2004), Loomis, Quattlebaum, 
Brown, and Alexander (2003), and Czetwertynski (2002). See discussion below. 
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categories of trades, the number of transfers across time, the changes in contract type over time, 
and differences in the markets across states.  Finally, section VIII offers a summary of some key 
findings.  
 
II. Appropriative Water Rights and Water Markets. 
To operate properly, any market requires reasonably secure property rights. 
Unfortunately, water rights are weaker than those for most resources due to water’s physical 
characteristics and unique legal status. Because water moves, surface water cannot be bounded 
or partitioned easily across claimants and uses. Surface water often is hydrologically connected 
to groundwater, which also migrates and is unobserved.
14  Moreover, simultaneous and 
sequential users of water make exclusion difficult and create numerous interdependencies.  
Consequently, the trade of water can inadvertently affect multiple parties.   
In western states, individuals do not own water as they might own land. The state owns 
the water which it holds in trust for its citizens. Individuals only hold usufruct rights to the water, 
subject to the requirement that the use be beneficial and reasonable and to oversight by the state 
in monitoring transfers to insure that they are consistent with the public interest.
15 Accordingly, 
water rights appear to have less protection or be more fragile than most other property rights.
16  
In general, western surface water rights are based on the prior appropriation doctrine that 
allows rights holders to withdraw a certain amount of water from a natural water course for 
                                                  
14 Glennon (2002, 35-50). 
 
15 Gould (1995, 94), Simms (1995, 321). 
 
16 Sax (1990, 260), Gray (1994b, 262), and Koehler (1995, 555).  
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private beneficial purposes on land remote from the point of diversion.17 Ownership of water is 
allocated through the rule of first possession or priority of claim.
18 Those with the earliest water 
claims have the highest priority and those with subsequent claims have lower-priority or junior 
claims. As such, there is a ladder of rights on a stream, ranging from highest in priority to the 
lowest. This allocative mechanism  ranks competing claimants based on priority in order to 
ration water during times of drought. Lower priority water rights carry greater risk in water 
transfers because of possible shortfalls, and accordingly are often of less value in water markets.  
Failure by rights holders to continue to use their water may result in the rights being lost 
through the doctrines of abandonment or forfeiture.
19 These doctrines create a perverse incentive 
for rights holders to use all their water. In many states, farmers who conserve water receive no 
benefit as the water saved will go to the next priority user on the river.  As a result, farmers are 
motivated to devote large quantities of water to grow low-value crops. Until the development of 
water markets and recognition by state legislatures that conservation measures are consistent 
with beneficial use, farmers could do little else with their excess water. California eliminated this 
disincentive to conserve with a statute that provides that, when the use of water is reduced 
through conservation, the conserved water may be sold, leased, or transferred.
20  
Because appropriative rights can be separated from the land and sold or leased, they can 
form the basis for private water trades.
21  Even so, the process can be complicated. Appropriative 
                                                  
17 Getches (1997, 74-189). California has a hybrid system that combines the prior appropriation doctrine with 
riparianism, a doctrine associated with the eastern United States that grants owners of land on rivers and streams 
rights to water. Glennon (2002, 14-15). 
 
18 See discussion of first possession in Epstein (1979), Rose (1985), and Lueck (1995, 1998). 
 
19 Getches (1997, 176-180). 
 
20 California Water Code, section 1011. 
 
21 Getches (1997, 156-60), Hirshleifer, DeHaven, and Millman (1960).   8 
rights are measured in terms of diversion, but transfers of water that change the point of 
diversion, timing, or nature of use are usually based on the amount of water consumed.
22 
Measuring transfers by consumption is important because it protects the rights of subsequent 
downstream diverters who have come to rely on the return flow from the first diversion. Hence, 
limiting trades to consumptive use reduces third-party effects on downstream diverters. 
However, calculating consumptive use is more difficult, thus driving up the transaction costs of 
trade.23    
Water markets also are affected by differential water quality, especially cross-sector 
trades from agriculture to urban. Urban utilities generally prefer and will pay more for high 
quality water that has less need for additional treatment. Within-sector trades may be easier 
because the level of water quality demanded and supplied may be more homogeneous. As we 
will see, municipalities and irrigators routinely transfer water among themselves.   
Water markets also depend on conveyance opportunities and the lack thereof can 
significantly reduce arbitrage possibilities.24 This requirement includes access to canals and 
aqueducts, as well as to rivers or streams whereby water can be released by one diverter and 
appropriated by another.  
Finally, water markets are generally local, or at most, state-wide markets. There is little 
private water trading across state lines due to a variety of state regulatory restrictions, and to the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
22 MacDonnell (1990, Vol. I, p. 11). 
 
23 Anderson and Johnson (1986) and Johnson, et al (1981). Johnson, et al describe how specifying a property right in 
water in terms of consumptive use with options for third-party grievances can be an effective method for promoting 
transfers.  Howitt and Hansen (2005, 60) point to both transaction costs through property rights and regulatory 
differences and often high costs of transporting water. 
 
24 Conveyance costs can be high. Hansen, Howitt and Williams (2007, 3) report that 55 percent of the $250 that the 
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California paid in 2002 for water from Northern California was for the cost 
of conveying it.    9 
costs associated with transporting a heavy commodity (an acre-foot of water weighs 1,358 tons) 
great distances. The price data bear out this situation by revealing the large arbitrage 
opportunities that exist among neighboring states. 
 
III. Water Marketing in the Economics Literature. 
  A large economics literature has addressed water re-allocation and the potential for water 
markets, and therefore we only acknowledge representative articles. It is generally accepted that 
sharp differences in marginal water values among agricultural, urban, and environmental uses 
exist. Some authors, however, express puzzlement regarding the comparatively limited extent of 
voluntary exchange (Young, 1986). One response has been to focus on the special characteristics 
of water that raise the costs of defining and enforcing water rights. These unique attributes result 
in pecuniary and technological externalities when water is transferred to a new location. Young 
and Haveman (1985) and Hanemann (2005) point to the simultaneous and sequential use of 
water, its mobility, its unobservability (groundwater), as well as the variability and thus 
uncertainty of the supply. These factors link parties so that an action by one likely impacts 
others, thus increasing measurement and bounding costs (making it difficult to clearly assign 
property rights) and thereby raising transaction costs.   
Related third-party effects from water transfers arise from a number of technological 
factors, including the hydrological and geological connection between surface and ground water. 
If farmers sell surface water and increase their groundwater withdrawal as a substitute, it may 
increase pumping costs, cause subsidence, and lower water quality (by salt water intrusion, for 
example) for other extractors (Glennon, 2002).  Conversely, a farmer who invests in ditch-lining 
and similar conservation actions, may reduce groundwater recharge to the detriment of other   10 
groundwater users (Knapp, Weinberg, Howitt, Posnikoff, 2003). Groundwater is typically a 
common-pool with very complex management requirements (Provencher, 1993; Provencher and 
Burt, 1993).  
Another technical externality arises from lost return flows when water is shipped out of 
the watershed. This effect occurs not only with reduced groundwater recharge, but also when 
upstream sales diminish downstream surface water. When a party diverts water from a stream, 
some water will be consumed, but much of it (perhaps 50 percent or more) will percolate back to 
the stream for use by others. When the diverted water is sold, however, this return flow may be 
blocked. Chang and Griffin (1992) point out that water markets have formed where such effects 
are small, either due to a limited number of potential third-parties or to a unique geography that 
makes return flow easy to quantify, track, and measure. Johnson, Gisser, and Werner (1981) 
argue that restricting transfers to consumptive use will limit these downstream effects.
25 
Besides technical externalities, there also can be pecuniary effects if the agricultural 
economy is diminished from water transfers. Hanak (2003) discusses both pecuniary and 
technological third-party effects in examining county restrictions in California on water transfers. 
Government tax revenues may shrink if farmers fallow land or non-profit entities (including 
municipalities) purchase water rights or secure long-term water leases.  Further, rural political 
influence may be lost when large water transfers are made, populations migrate away, and there 
is no clear mechanism for compensation. Political opposition to water transfers over these issues 
can arise even when the actual costs are likely to be fairly small.
26 Similar equity issues 
                                                  
25See also Livingston and Miller (1986). 
 
26 Hanak’s survey of the literature (2003, 81) points out that effects of fallowing irrigated farmland is likely to have 
no more than a 1 percent effect on overall county economic activity, even when payments for economic adjustments 
are not included. 
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associated with water trades are addressed by Charney and Woodard (1990), Howe, Lazo, and 
Weber (1990), Howitt (1994), and Howe and Goemans (2003).
27  These distributional effects 
increase opposition to water markets (Haddad, 2000, 33-48).  
To reduce the third-party effects of water trades, states have established review processes 
for transfers. Regulatory requirements, however, can impact trades. The analysis by Howe, 
Boggs, and Butler (1990) shows a wide range of transaction costs in nine case studies of water 
transfers. They find that costs tend to be smaller if: (i) larger amounts are involved; (ii) there is 
less opposition to the transfer; and (iii) the water right has a higher priority. Similarly, Colby 
(1990) found that regulatory review in some states could significantly delay the process and raise 
transaction costs.
28  
 While some institutional structures can retard trading, others can promote it by reducing 
transaction costs. Notable is the Colorado-Big Thompson Project (C-BT) and the associated 
Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District whose institutional structure facilitates 
intertemporal and intersectional water trades. Carey and Sunding (2001) compare the C-BT with 
the California Central Valley Project (CVP). With a much larger service area, the CVP has 
multiple water districts with differing regulations and procedures for transfers. Whereas internal 
district water trades are customary and low-cost, inter-district water transfers within the CVP are 
more complicated with lengthy approval processes. One issue involves environmental concerns 
when water is shipped north to south through the Sacramento Delta.  In part because of these 
                                                  
27See the readings included in National Research Council (1992) and the volume edited by Carter, Vaux, and 
Scheuring (1994).  Brewer, Glennon, Ker, and Libecap (2007) introduce water market data and discuss regulatory 
issues. 
 
28 Various state regulations regarding transfers are outlined in MacDonnell (1990); Hogge, Hansen, Riley, and Davis 
(1990) for Utah; Brown, Du Mars, Minnis, Smasal, Kennedy, and Urban (1990) for New Mexico; MacDonnell, 
Howe, and Rice (1990) for Colorado; Woodard and  McCarthy (1990) for Arizona, and Squillace (1990) for 
Wyoming.  
   12 
conditions, most trades are within CVP districts and involve short-term leases. There are 
relatively fewer water sales or other cross-district transactions. In contrast to the CVP, within the 
C-BT, environmental conditions are more homogeneous, and there is an active water sales 
market among irrigators and between agricultural and urban users. Water allocations are 
uniformly defined and proportionally adjusted as water supplies vary; trading rules are the same; 
and because there is only a single water district within the C-BT, all return flow effects are 
internalized within the organization, facilitating adjustments to minimize any third-party losses 
from a trade.29    
Despite problems of developing water markets, most of the economics literature 
emphasizes the gains from expanding water trading.
30 Anderson and Snyder (1997) summarize 
the overall benefits. Howitt (1994) points to the role of the water bank established by California 
during 1991 in mitigating the effects of drought. Colby, McGinnis, and Rait (1991) examine the 
use of voluntary transfers to augment instream flows and improve habitat in the Truckee-Carson 
drainage of Northern Nevada.31 Howe, Schurmeier, and Shaw (1986) outline a range of benefits 
of greater reliance on water markets.  
Four recent papers use Water Strategist data to outline trends in water market activity in 
the Western United States (Brown (2006); Howitt and Hansen (2005); Brookshire, Colby, Ewers, 
and Ganderton, (2004); Loomis, Quattlebaum, Brown, and Alexander, (2003)).
32 Loomis, et al 
                                                  
29 See also discussion of the C-BT institutional structure in Howitt and Hansen (2005, 60). 
 
30 See the summary of benefits in Haddad (2000, 19-32).  
 
31 Instream flow rights have particular problems because they require relaxing beneficial use requirements in 
appropriative water rights and because they are costly to enforce from downstream diversion.  See Anderson and 
Johnson (1986).  
 
32 See also, Adams, Crews, and Cummings (2004), Czetwertynski (2002), and the recent working paper by Hansen, 
Howitt and Williams (2007). 
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use price and quantity data from the trade journal for five years (1995-99) to evaluate the extent 
of water sales and leasing from agriculture to accomplish environmental objectives in nine 
western states.  They conclude that water markets are more likely to be a means of facilitating 
the smoother re-allocation of water than reliance on (non-voluntary) regulatory re-allocation. 
 Brookshire, et al use price data between 1990 and 2001 from 608 trades to compare the 
relative development of water markets in the Central Arizona Water Conservancy District 
(CAWCD), the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District (NCWCD), and the Middle Rio 
Grande Conservancy District (MRGCD) in New Mexico. The authors find that water trading is 
most active and routine in the NCWCD, followed by the MRGCD and the CAWCD. Institutional 
details regarding the nature of water rights and the associated transaction costs of trading explain 
the differential roles of water markets across the three regions. Howitt and Hansen examine 
transfers between 1999 and 2002 across 14 states to determine the relative volumes and prices 
for water rights sales and water leases. They conclude that leases account for 90 percent of the 
volume of transactions (as measured by annual flow), but that sales prices are substantially 
higher than lease prices. They find a mean implicit capitalization rate (ICR) for lease to sales 
prices at 6.6 percent, which is slightly below a standard commercial capitalization rate.  In 
examining this observation, the authors suggest that sales prices are being driven up in order to 
mitigate the risk of water shortfalls during drought.  
Brown’s study is most similar to the present one. He analyzes 1,380 water transactions 
between 1990 and 2003 in 14 states.
33 He argues that more water is traded via leases than 
through sales. According to his data, the number of leases grew over the 14-year period, roughly 
                                                  
33 Because he was concerned about very active C-BT trading overwhelming the summary statistics, Brown 
combines all C-BT transactions for a simple purpose for a given month into a single case. This reduces the over all 
number of transactions from 2,450 to 1,729 in his data set. Another 349 are dropped because of missing information, 
leaving 1,380.   14 
doubling in number, whereas the number of sales did not. Further, leases involved larger 
amounts of water on average than did sales. The most active lease transactions involved large 
government-funded projects, such as the Central Arizona Project and the State Water Project in 
California.  Municipal leases of water grew relative to those for agricultural and environmental 
uses after 1998. In terms of sales, most purchases of water rights were by municipalities from 
irrigators.  
With regard to prices, Brown reports that lease prices for municipal use were higher than 
for agricultural and environmental leases, but that sales prices for municipal water were only 
slightly higher than for irrigation water.  Both were greater than environmental sales prices. 
Brown also computes implicit capitalization rates (ICR), finding a median ICR of 1.94 percent, 
well below that reported by Howitt and Hansen and any standard commercial capitalization rate. 
He argues that the low ICR reflects both low lease prices in agriculture and high prices paid by 
water rights purchasers.  Even so, Brown finds that lease prices have been rising in real terms 
since the late 1990s, but sales prices have had no clear trend.  These studies describe an active 
water market, especially through leasing water for trades within agriculture.  
In the next section, we present more comprehensive data from 1987 through 2005 for 
3,232 water transfers in twelve semi-arid western states. Unlike the above studies, we break 
leases into single and multi-year transactions and analyze them separately with respect to 
volumes and prices. In comparing leases and sales amounts with respect to prices, we focus on 
sales and one-year leases, rather than a composite of leases as has been done in other studies. 
This is important because multi-year leases can have much higher prices than one-year leases 
and thereby alter any ICR calculations. In addition to examining the annual flow of water in each 
transaction, we calculate the water committed through sales and multi-year leases.  This   15 
approach is important because the committed measure substantially changes the assessment of 
the quantities conveyed by contract type across sectors and across time.   
For example, in our data, 79 percent of all leases are one-year (771) and they account for 
91 percent of all leased water, measured by annual flow. If, however, the amounts of water 
obligated through multi-year leases are considered, the amounts involved in one-year leases fall 
to only 47 percent of the total water transferred by leasing agreements. Accordingly, it is 
important to consider the separate role of each contract type and how it facilitates the movement 
of water from one party to another. Because of the number of transactions included and the 
approach we adopt, our study yields the most complete view of the development of water 
markets in the American West.  
 
IV. Data Collection Methodology.  
To assemble our water market data, we recorded every transfer listed in the Water 
Strategist from January 1987 through December 2005 for Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, 
Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Wyoming, and Washington.  Two of the 
most important variables were the original and the proposed use of each transfer.  We classified 
these uses as either agriculture, urban (municipal and industrial), or environmental.  This 
classification system provided for nine possible combinations.
34 Because we are particularly 
interested in water re-allocation, we focus on cross-sector trades, from agriculture-to-urban and 
within-sector trades from agriculture-to-agriculture and urban-to-urban.   
                                                  
34 The nine classifications are: agricultural-to-agricultural, agricultural-to-urban, agricultural-to-environmental, 
urban-to-agricultural, urban-to-urban, urban-to-environmental, environmental-to-agricultural, environmental-to-
urban, and environmental-to-environmental. 
   16 
For the majority of transfers, the Water Strategist explicitly indicated both the original 
and the ultimate purpose of the water and briefly described the details of each transaction.  In 
cases where the entry did not explicitly state the nature of use before or after the transaction, it 
often was easy to determine the origination and destination uses from the context of the 
description. For a few transactions where the entry did not include the original and ultimate uses 
and the transaction description was not informative, we developed rules for classifying these 
transactions.35  
  According to our rules-of-thumb, we classified a use as agricultural if the name of the 
lessor, lessee, seller, or buyer, was an irrigator, an irrigation district, a water district, a farmer, a 
ranch, a canal company, a ditch company or an individual.
36  Similarly, we designated a use as 
agricultural if the description of the transaction stated that the water was employed in agriculture, 
if the water was provided by land fallowing, or if the description discussed widespread farming 
in the district from which the water was supplied.   
We classified a party as environmental if it was a state department of fish and wildlife or 
a nature conservancy.  The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, generally an agricultural water supplier, 
was labeled environmental when it acted to improve or maintain instream flows, to help fish 
stocks, to preserve water quality levels, or engaged in other similar activities.  When a party was 
a water conservation or conservancy district, we designated the transfer as agricultural, as urban, 
                                                  
35In select cases where the description of the transfer contained in the Water Strategist was ambiguous, we relied 
upon Robert Glennon’s knowledge of water institutions in the West (aided by Google searches). These transfers 
primarily occurred in Arizona and California and consisted of approximately 55 of the 3,317 transfers in the dataset. 
 
36One could potentially argue that an individual should be classified as an urban user instead of an agricultural user, 
but we decided that it was more likely that an individual (not a city, a corporation, or another entity reflecting 
municipal or industrial use) was an agricultural user, especially if the individual was a seller.   The Water Strategist 
described an individual as a seller of water 88 times and as the buyer 9 times.  The total water that was transferred 
when either the buyer or the seller was listed as an individual was 22,467 acre-feet.  This amount is less than .01%of 
the total water transferred in our dataset.  One transfer by an individual accounted for 15,000 acre-feet of the total 
22,467 acre-feet transferred.   
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or as a combination agriculture and urban trade, not environmental. Most water conservation or 
conservancy districts are primarily involved in agricultural activities or in some cases urban 
and/or a combination of agriculture and urban.  
   Lastly, in cases where the Water Strategist either did not explicitly discuss the use of the 
water or its description was too vague, we assigned urban when cities, townships, municipal 
water districts, developers, manufacturing and mining companies, golf courses, and landscape 
irrigators were involved.    
Despite our best efforts to develop classification rules that would reliably identify 
transactors, the information, in some cases, was simply incomplete. These transfers lacking an 
identifiable origin or destination use were relatively rare, accounting for 85 (2.6 percent) of the 
3,317 transactions in our data set. They are excluded from our dataset and thus the tables and 
analyses provided below are based on the remaining 3,232 observations.
37 
Finally, a single transaction occasionally involved multiple transfers and sectors. For 
example, an entry might include an irrigator and a city that transferred a combined 10,000 acre-
feet of water to another city.  In this case, the destination of the transfer is clearly urban, but the 
origination came from agriculture and urban. In many instances, the description included a 
breakdown that allowed us to identify the sectors. For example, if the irrigator and city each 
transferred 5,000 acre-feet, we noted two transactions, one of 5,000 acre-feet provided from 
agriculture-to-urban and one of 5,000 acre-feet from urban-to-urban. If the information did not 
allow use to make such attributions, we classified the transfers as “combination” transfers.  Of 
the 3,317 transfers in our dataset, 161 (4.9 percent) were combination transfers.38  
                                                  
37 These unknown transfers account for 798,932 acre-feet of water, about 2.5 percent of the total in our data set. Our 
data set is available on the UCSB, Bren, webpage. 
 
38 Combination transfers account for 4,939,997 acre-feet, about 15.5 percent of the total in our data set.    18 
V. Measuring the Volume of Water Traded.  
  We measure and report the volume of water traded in two ways.  The measure used in the 
literature is the annual flow of water as listed in the Water Strategist. Unfortunately, this annual 
flow measure reflects only the amount of water transferred in the initial year of the transaction. 
For example, a transaction in the Water Strategist typically states that 1,000 acre-feet was leased 
for a specified number of years or sold.  The annual flow measure would only record the 1,000 
acre-feet transferred in the year the transaction originated. By this measure a sale or multi-year 
lease of 1,000 acre-feet is identical to a one-year lease. This approach substantially biases 
downward the impact of multi-year leases and sales on the volume of water traded. An 
alternative and perhaps more intuitive measure would annually record water traded through 
multi-year leases and sales for the duration of the contract (in perpetuity for sales). This measure, 
however, would be misrepresentative in our sample, because any sales and multi-year leases 
consummated before 1987 (at the start of the data set) would necessarily be ignored, thus 
possibly creating an artificial upward trend.  
Accordingly, we introduce a “committed” water variable that avoids the undercounting 
associated with the annual flow variable and any downward bias early in the sample. The 
committed variable includes all transfers that originated in a given year.  It projects the annual 
flow forward for the term of the transaction, i.e., five years for a five-year lease or in perpetuity 
for a sale, and then discounts the flow by 5 percent per year and sums the series to arrive at a 
single committed amount of water analogous to a present value of a series of annual payments.
39 
                                                  
39 To illustrate the differences between the annual flow and committed variables, consider a 5-year lease of 1,000 
acre-feet per year beginning in 1990. The annual flow metric would record 1,000 acre-feet in 1990 only. The 
committed variable instead would discount the 1,000 acre -feet transacted annually across the five years of the 
contract at 5 percent and sum the total. In so doing, 4,329 acre-feet would be recorded for 1990, rather than 1,000 
acre-feet.  
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As we show below, sales and multi-year leases are an important part of water markets, and this 




VI. Price Trends: Evidence of Re-allocation Pressures. 
  Of the 3,232 transactions in our data set with information on the transacting parties, 
amounts, and nature of use, a smaller number, 2,154, had price data.41  Of these, 1,836 involved 
the three classifications of primary interest: within-sector, agriculture-to-agriculture and urban-
to-urban transactions, and across-sector, agriculture-to-urban trades.  
We converted all prices into dollars per acre-foot of water for comparison across time and 
contract type. Prices for one-year transactions were easily presented in per acre-foot terms.  For 
example, if 1,000 acre-feet of water was leased for one year for a total price of $100,000, then 
the per acre-foot price was $100.  Prices for sales could be handled in two ways. First, consider a 
sale of 1,000 acre-feet of water for a total price of $2 million.  The per-acre foot price is $2,000. 
                                                  
40For example, see the annual flow measures used by Brown (2006) and Howitt and Hansen (2005).  We recognize 
that during dry years the actual amount of water available may be substantially less than the contractual amount if 
sales or leases involve very junior priority rights.  For example, dry-year contingencies in long-term contracts may 
allow for reduced volumes to flow by specifying that up to a certain amount would be traded or that the transfer 
would be between two amounts. Unfortunately, in our data set, we do not observe the actual amounts transferred. To 
account for potential biases when contingent transfers were involved, we created three separate measures for both 
the annual flow and committed variables calculated in our data set: minimum, maximum, and the mean amount 
transferred. For a 2-year lease of up to 1,000 acre-feet annually, the minimum annual flow (committed) amount was 
0 acre-feet (0 acre-feet), the maximum annual flow (committed) was 1,000 acre-feet (1,859 acre-feet), and the 
average annual flow (committed) was 500 acre-feet (930 acre-feet). The results reported in this paper use the mean 
annual flow and mean committed amounts. Because there are relatively few contingent contracts in our data set, the 
results and conclusions do not change in any meaningful way if either the minimum or maximum amounts are used 
instead.   
 
41 In our data set, 2,189 transfers had price information, but 35 of these were “unknown” transfers, those where we 
could not determine the sector where they originated or ended. For that reason we use 2,154 transfers where we had 
such information. Overall, there were 85 “unknown” transfers in our data set and 50 of them did not have price data. 
The disparity between the overall number of transfers in the data set, 3,232 and 2,189 is due to cases in which the 
Water Strategist did not provide price information or the entry coupled the sale of land and water into one price and 
we had no way of disentangling the two in order to determine the price of the water.   
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This price, however, is not directly comparable to the one-year lease price because the sale 
commits a flow of water to the buyer in perpetuity.  Therefore, we construct a second price 
which is analogous to a one-year lease price. By discounting quantity flows, using the same 
methodology as for determining the present value of a perpetual bond, we calculate a single 
committed quantity.  With this discounted quantity we convert the total sales price into a per 
acre-foot price that is directly comparable to a per acre-foot, one-year lease price. In the example 
of a sale of 1,000 acre-feet of water for a total price of $2 million, using 5 percent to discount the 
quantity flows leads to discounted sales price of $100 per acre-foot (multi-year lease prices are 
converted in the same manner one would use to find the present value of a multi-year bond).  
Finally, rather than assuming a discount rate, we took the mean (or median) sales and mean (or 
median) one-year lease price and found the discount rate that equates the two. This computed 
discount rate is termed the Implicit Capitalization Rate (ICR).    
Table 1 reports mean and median water prices for agriculture-to-urban and agriculture-to-
agriculture leases (one-year and multi-year combined) and sales. The prices are per-acre foot, 
and the amounts are the annual flows during the first year of the contract as described in the 
Water Strategist.  As shown, the annual mean and median sale and lease prices for agriculture-
to-urban transactions are significantly higher than are agriculture-to-agriculture trades (using a 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test at a 5 percent level of significance).
42 This condition in part indicates 
the benefits of out-of-sector water transfers.
43 Other factors, such as more senior rights that may 
                                                  
42 The Wilcoxon signed-rank test is similar to the standard difference-in-means t-test.  However, its non-parametric 
nature allows additional flexibility as it does not require a-priori assumptions on the distribution of its components.   
 
43 Because our sample covers the years 1987 – 2005, prices were converted into real dollars to compare prices across 
years.  All prices where converted into 1987 dollars using the Consumer Price Index – All Urban Consumers 
Average from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  The patterns shown in the table hold if median prices are used instead 
of mean values although the differences are narrowed.  Further, if transactions in the very active water market state 
of Colorado are removed, the price differences remain, but the number of observations is reduced.  
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be associated with agriculture-to-urban transfers and higher wheeling costs, also explain the 
higher prices. Further, because sales involve the transfer of water rights and a perpetual claim on 
water flows as compared to leases, which involve a shorter-term (often one year) transfer of the 
right to use water, sales prices will be higher than lease prices.
44  
Table 1 













Mean Price   $114  $29  $4,366  $1,747 
Median Price  $40  $10  $2,643  $1,235 
Number of Observations  189  178  1,013  169 
 
Figure 1 plots the annual median sales price per-acre foot from 1987 through 2005 for 
agricultural-to-agricultural and agricultural-to-urban trades. As illustrated, the price differences 
between agriculture-to-urban and agriculture-to-agriculture water sales have been pronounced 
and growing since 1995. Using the paired annual differences and calculating a Wilcoxon signed-
rank test statistic, we find that the annual median sales prices are statistically higher for 
agricultural-to-urban trades relative to agricultural-to-agricultural trades at a 5 percent 
significance level. Similar pricing patterns and test results are revealed if committed water is 











                                                  
44 As we have noted earlier, sales prices may also be higher if the priority of the water right is higher for water sold 
than for water leased.    22 
Figure 1 















Figure 2 plots the annual median combined lease price from 1987 to 2005. Consistent 
with sales prices, lease prices for urban uses are significantly higher than are those for 
agricultural uses (using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test at a 5 percent significance level). The low 
number of leases explains the relatively noisy time series. We report the combined (discounted) 
multi-year lease and one-year lease prices because the latter dominate in agricultural 
transactions, whereas multi-year leases are common in agriculture-to-urban transactions.
45 
Figure 2 












**Note: multi-year lease quantities are discounted at 5%. 
 
                                                  
45 There are more one-year agriculture-to-agriculture leases (222) than one-year agriculture-to-urban leases (165), 
but fewer agriculture-to-agriculture multi-year leases (18) than agriculture-to-urban multi-year leases (86). Although 
we combine short and long-term leases in Figure 2, the price trends for median lease prices are similar for both 
short-term and long-term leases.   23 
Table 2 presents median prices by sector and contract type for each of the twelve western 
states for one-year leases and sales.  Also calculated is the implicit conversion rate, ICR. The “*” 
denotes where the number of sales or one-year leases with price data in the given state is less 
than 10,  whereas “n/a” denotes where there were no sales and/or leases with price data for that 
given state. Because multi-year leases would require discounting, which implies an ICR, and we 
are interested in finding it, we only use one-year lease prices to compare to the sales price.
46  
Table 2 
Prices by State and by Sector 
      All Sectors        Ag-to-Ag        Ag-to-Urban    
   One-year        One-year        One-year       
   Leases  Sales  ICR  Leases  Sales  ICR  Leases  Sales  ICR 
AZ  $43.12  $786.16  5.5%  $33.03  $721.65  4.6*  $54.81  $182.57  30.0%* 
CA  $44.53  $641.45  6.9%  $39.11  $864.35  4.5%*  $83.41  $641.45  13.0% 
CO  $12.54  $2,693.38  0.5%  $13.67  $1,487.55  0.9%*  $28.70  $3,687.12  0.8% 
ID  $4.43  $59.70  7.4%  $4.43  $59.76  7.4%*  $2.40  $106.37  2.3%* 
MT  $8.14  $100.22  8.1%*  $3.49  n/a  n/a  $17.60  n/a  n/a 
NM  $28.94  $1,250.00  2.3%  $13.69  $1,150.00  1.2%*  n/a  $1,592.86  n/a 
NV  $23.77  $1,992.28  1.2%*  n/a  n/a  n/a  $23.77  $1,952.55  1.2%* 
OR  $7.49  $111.37  6.7%*  $4.88  n/a  n/a  $6.49  n/a  n/a 
TX  $18.87  $461.79  4.1%  $17.42  $217.29  8.0%*  $18.82  $465.41  4.0% 
UT  $4.63  $356.22  1.3%  $4.29  $681.87  0.6%*  $92.15  $331.29  27.8%* 
WA  $20.21  $289.93  7.0%*  $10.30  n/a  n/a  $25.01  $417.85  6.0%* 
WY  $27.27  $1,073.22  2.5%*  $2.38  $121.85  2.0%*  $45.10  $1,440.41  3.1%* 
All  $27.69  $1,752.06  1.6%  $10.68  $1,235.39  0.9%  $41.00  $2,642.70  1.6% 
 
While the median prices vary across states and sectors for both sales and one-year leases, 
there is significantly more variation across states than across sectors. This phenomenon is 
illustrated by the ICRs. Across states, ICRs for all-sector trades vary from a low of 0.5 percent 
(Colorado) to a high of 8.1 percent (Montana). By contrast, the ICR for agriculture-to-agriculture 
                                                  
46 Brown (2006) also calculates ICRs. His price data are for 1990-2003, while ours are for 1897-2005.  Nevertheless 
the calculations are quite similar if we use his time period. (Brown’s categories)       
Brown    Our calculations       
1990-2003  1990-2003 
Urban (Municipal)  2.64%    2.73% 
Ag (Irrigation)    0.65    0.87 
Environment    5.37    6.78 
All states    1.94    2.00   24 
transfers is 0.9 percent compared to 1.6 percent agriculture-to-urban transfers.  The variation in 
price across the states reflects differences in demand and supply characteristics, transaction type, 
as well as transaction costs – all of which are primarily state driven (e.g. population, weather, 
water endowments, conveyance potential, political and legal institutions) and the regulatory 
restrictions that prevent arbitrage across the states.
47  
To further explore price patterns, Table 3 presents the median prices for one-year leases 
and sales and the corresponding ICRs over time. As sales prices have risen and lease prices have 
fallen, the ICRs have dramatically decreased over time.  A sign test reveals that there is a 
significant downward trend. Sales of water rights, which carry more security and are used more 
in agriculture-to-urban trades, are in growing demand relative to short-term leases, which are 
used more in agriculture-to-agriculture transactions.  
Table 3 
 Median Prices by Year across All States and Sectors 
   One-year Leases  Sales  ICR 
1987  $60.76  $1,200.00  5.1% 
1988  $50.41  $960.27  5.3% 
1989  $41.23  $1,112.44  3.7% 
1990  $39.11  $1,432.79  2.7% 
1991  $91.75  $1,752.45  5.2% 
1992  $18.22  $1,656.23  1.1% 
1993  $11.79  $1,411.66  0.8% 
1994  $29.13  $1,450.94  2.0% 
1995  $13.69  $1,680.55  0.8% 
1996  $29.69  $2,389.29  1.2% 
1997  $17.59  $2,818.40  0.6% 
1998  $19.51  $3,902.82  0.5% 
1999  $14.72  $3,550.23  0.4% 
2000  $26.39  $7,586.53  0.3% 
2001  $31.37  $7,171.72  0.4% 
2002  $31.57  $8,299.21  0.4% 
2003  $29.02  $10,905.56  0.3% 
2004  $30.07  $10,624.32  0.3% 
2005  $27.34  $8,912.00  0.3% 
Median  $27.69  $1,752.06  1.6% 
                                                  
47 In other work, we are examining the effects of state regulatory and property rights regimes on observed water 
transfers, controlling for economic, political, water supply, and infrastructure characteristics.    25 
 
  In summary, the price data reveal that (1) state water markets are quite different as 
reflected in the varying state prices and (2) there are few arbitrage activities across the states to 
narrow those differences. While state price variations can be explained in part by sector-specific 
dominance in one state versus another, the variance of prices across states is much greater than 
the variance across sectors within a state. The price data also indicate a growing premium to 
purchase water rights rather than lease water. Finally, the price data demonstrate that urban users 
pay considerably more in purchasing and leasing water relative to agricultural users.  
 
VII. Western Water Transfers 
Contractual Form 
As we have shown, in responding to opportunities to move water within and across 
sectors in response to price differentials, various contractual forms are possible: one-year leases, 
multi-year leases, and sales.  Although leases involve the right to use water and not the transfer 
of the water right, some can be quite long as indicated in Table 4, which lists leases by their 
duration.  As shown, most leases have short terms, with nearly 80 percent being one-year or less 
and over 85 percent being 5-years or less.  Some leases, however, approximate sales with terms 
of 50 or more years.   
Table 4 
Leases by Lease-Length 
Duration  Number  Frequency 
Average 
Size 
1-year  771  79%  30,416 
2-5 years  65  7%  12,088 
6-9 years  4  0%  6,287 
10-19 years  40  4%  8,759 
20-29 years  39  4%  5,558 
30-39 years  12  1%  7,699 
40-49 years  18  2%  14,718 
50-74 years  10  1%  50,086   26 
75-year  13  1%  2,126 
100-year  9  1%  14,632 
Total  981  100%  26,347 
 
Table 5 provides additional information on the relative importance of each type of 




Water Transactions by Contract Type and Category, 1987-2005 
      Ag-to-Urban  Ag-to-Ag  Urban-to-Urban     Ag-to-Urban  Ag-to-Ag  Urban-to-Urban 
      Number of Transfers     Number of Transfers 
Sale      1,543  215  269     1,543  215  269 
One-year  165  222  97     165  222  97 
Lease  Multi-year  86  18  49     86  18  49 
      Total Quantities: Committed (af)     Total Quantities: Annual Flow (af) 
Sale      25,821,328  8,422,685  12,109,620     1,291,066  421,134  605,481 
One-year  3,251,123  6,355,338  4,247,688     3,251,123  6,355,338  4,247,688 
Lease  Multi-year  8,794,128  990,393  9,961,049     729,732  90,659  679,996 
      Committed Average Size (af)     Annual Flow Average Size (af) 
Sale      16,734  39,175  45,017     837  1,959  2,251 
One-year  19,704  28,628  43,791     19,704  28,628  43,791 
Lease  Multi-year  102,257  55,022  203,287     8,485  5,037  13,877 
 
 
  The data in Table 5 show that most agriculture-to-urban transfers occur through sales that 
involve comparatively small amounts, 837 acre-feet on average as measured by the annual flow 
and 16,734 acre-feet on average as measured by the amount committed.
49 In part, as noted 
earlier, this pattern reflects the large number of small transactions that take place in Colorado 
within the Colorado-Big-Thompson Project.  Sales occur less frequently for agriculture-to-
                                                  
48 Eighty-six transfers were neither leases nor sales and are not included in Table 4.  An example of such a transfer 
would be an exchange for service between two parties.  For example, a developer might give his water right to the 
city free of charge in return for a service.  
  
49 The Water Strategist sometimes referred to transactions as sales that transferred the water but not necessarily the 
water right.  In our data set these are referred to as short-term sales.  Short-term sales can be thought of in a similar 
manner as a one-year lease and are thus included in all one-year leases categories.  Of the 110 short-term sales that 
occurred over the 19 years in our dataset, 80 were in California.  There were 71 permanent sales in California.  
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agriculture and urban-to-urban transactions. Even if we omit Colorado sales and recalculate,  
average sales size is 6,273 acre-feet (annual flow), sales transfers typically are smaller than for 
long-term or one-year leases in agriculture-to-urban transactions.
50  
Within-sector, urban-to-urban transfers have more permanent sales (269) than leases 
(146), but the average sale size is small, at 2,251 acre-feet, compared to the average size of one-
year and multi-year leases, at 40,791 and 13,877 acre-feet, respectively.  Over four times the 
amount of water measured by annual flows is transferred between cities and from businesses or 
mining companies by one-year leases than by multi-year leases and sales.  When committed 
amounts are considered, however, sales and multi-year leases involve over ten times the amount 
of water traded through short-term leases. 
The data in Table 5 also reveal the importance of one-year leases for balancing short-term 
water demand and supply conditions among agricultural and urban users. One-year leases were 
used to temporarily move 3,251,123 acre-feet from agriculture to cities and 4,247,688 acre-feet 
to cities from other urban users. Transaction sizes (annual flow) for one-year leases in 
agriculture-to-urban trades also are large, averaging 19,704 acre-feet, more than double the size 
of multi-year leases, and almost 24 times the mean size of each sale. These transactions may be 
large because they do not imply a permanent loss of water in the watershed. Multi-year leases, 
which involve longer-term commitments of water, are less common than are one-year leases, 86 
compared to 165, and are smaller as measured by annual flow. Of the multi-year leases, 18 are 
less than five years and 68 are more than five years.   
Agriculture-to-agriculture trades usually occur (240) through a lease, generally for one 
year.  Like cross-sector leases, agriculture-to-agriculture leases involve much larger amounts of 
water (28,628 acre-feet) than do water sales as measured by the annual flow. Farmers trade water 
                                                  
50 Dropping Colorado transactions leaves 566 sales transactions for 3,550,415 acre-feet, annual flows.   28 
among themselves routinely using short-term leases to meet temporary short falls or for other 
transitory market reasons. Many of these transactions take place locally often within the 
irrigation district to which both farmers belong.
51 As noted earlier, these transactions can involve 
water of lower quality and with lower priority appropriative water rights than required for 
agriculture-to-urban transactions. Sales within agriculture are numerous, but generally involve 
small amounts of water with a mean transaction size of 1,959 acre-feet (annual flow), although 
the average committed size is much larger at 39,175 acre-feet.  
Table 6 
Water Transactions by Contract Type 1987-2005 
              Committed             Annual Flow  
   # of Transfers  Frequency  Amount(af)  Frequency  Amount(af)  Frequency 
One-year 
Leases  771  24%  23,450,450  17%  23,450,450  76% 
Multi-year 
Leases  210  6%  26,759,628  19%  2,395,430   8% 
All Leases  981  30%  50,210,078  36%  25,845,880   83% 
Sales  2,165  67%  79,496,161  58%  3,974,808   13% 
Miscellaneous
1  86  3%  8,353,065  6%  1,143,890   4% 
 All Transfers  3,232  100%  138,059,304  100%  30,964,578   100% 
1 Miscellaneous transfers are listed as “exchanges” and “storages” in the Water Strategist. 
 
  Table 6 summarizes all water transfers from 1987 through 2005 by contract type. 
Although sales account for 67 percent of all transactions, they involve just 13 percent of the 
water traded as measured by annual flow.  Considering perpetual commitments, however, raises 
the amount of water involved to 58 percent of the water traded. Leases account for only 30 
percent of transactions, but transfer 83 percent of water as measured by annual flow. Considering 
committed water, however, lowers the amount of water traded by leases to 36 percent. 
 
                                                  
51 Irrigation districts are political subdivisions of the state that supply farmers with irrigation water.  Elected 
governing boards run irrigation districts. For discussion, see Thompson (1993, 687-701). Internal district water 
transactions may not be included in our data set from the Water Strategist because they may not be reported.   29 
Aggregate Transfer Data by Category 
Table 7 provides a comprehensive overview of 3,232 water transfers in the 12 western 
states between 1987 and 2005.
52 Although we are primarily interested in agriculture-to-
agriculture, agriculture-to-urban, and urban-to-urban trades, the table provides information for all 
major sector transactions. 
  Table 7 
Water Transfers by Sector, 1987-2005 
                    Committed             Annual Flow 
 Classification  # of Transfers  Frequency  Amount(af)  Frequency  Amount(af)  Frequency 
Ag-to-Ag  471  15%  16,241,925  12%    7,138,480   23% 
Ag-to-Urban  1,825  56%  39,747,584  29%  5,533,394   18% 
Ag-to-Environment  233  7%  18,186,143  13%  6,014,228   19% 
Urban-to-Ag  38  1%  2,549,986  2%  326,440   1% 
Urban-to-Urban  440  14%  26,600,020  19%  5,657,591   18% 
Urban-to-
Environment  54  2%  8,925,447  6%  1,054,031   3% 
Environment-to-Ag  0  0%  0  0%  0  0% 
Environment-to-
Urban  1  0%  62  0%  62  0% 
Environment-to-
Environment  6  0%  4,171,200  3%  284,560   1% 
Combination  164  5%  21,636,938  16%  4,955,791   16% 
Total  3,232  100%  138,059,303  100%  30,964,577   100% 
 
As shown in Table 7, agriculture is the origin of 78 percent of all trades and 60 percent of 
all water traded, as measured by annual flows, and 54 percent of all water committed. 
Agriculture-to-urban trades are by far the most numerous, accounting for 56 percent of all 
transfers and involve 5.5 million acre-feet or 18 percent of all water transferred as measured by 
annual flows and 39.7 million acre-feet or 29 percent of committed water. Agriculture-to-
agriculture transactions represent 15 percent of all trades and involve 23 percent of the water 
transferred as measured by annual flow and 12 percent of the committed water.  
                                                  
52 Less 85 unknown transfers.  For more complete discussion of the legal issues involved in water transfers, see 
Brewer, Glennon, Ker, and Libecap (2007).    30 
The data reveal a significant movement of water out of agriculture in response to the 
price differentials discussed earlier. Urban-to-urban transactions account for 14 percent of the 
number of transfers, involve 18 percent of annual flows, and 19 percent of water committed. If 
these two major within-sector categories are combined, they comprise 29 percent of water trades; 
41 percent of annual flows; and 31 percent of committed water.  The difference between the 
committed and annual flow measures confirm what was found in Table 5: within-sector trades 
rely more on one-year leases, while out-of-sector trades rely more on sales and long-term leases.  
These transfers, particularly agriculture-to-urban transactions, are more numerous but 
comparatively small. These transfers typically involve changes in the location, timing, and/or 
nature of water use, all of which can have important effects on other users. These types of 
transactions are significantly more controversial and generally require state regulatory review. 
Because larger transfers are more likely to affect third parties, agriculture-to-urban trades are 
smaller, roughly one-fourth to one-fifth the size of agriculture-to-agriculture and urban-to-urban 
transfers.  Smaller transfers likely have fewer external effects. 
 
Water Transfers Across Time  
Figure 3 details water market activity across time. The figure shows that: (1) the total 
number of water transfers is increasing (statistically significant); (2) agriculture-to-urban trades 
are also rising (statistically significant); and (3) neither agriculture-to-agriculture trades nor 
urban-to-urban trades show a discernable trend (statistically insignificant). Given that Colorado 
dominates the number of transactions, we note that the trends remain the same but are less 
pronounced when Colorado is removed.  
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Figure 3 
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Figure 4 shows the quantities of water transferred across time. Importantly, if we measure 
the total quantity of water transferred by annual flow, there is no statistically significant upward 
trend, whereas if we measure the water traded by total water contractually committed, there is a 
statistically significant upward trend (at a 5 percent significance level).
53  The rising trend of the 
committed measure is capturing the fact that the number of sales is increasing over time (see 
Figure 7).   
Figure 4 
















                                                  
53 A Wilcoxon signed-rank test is used to test trend by first differencing more recent realizations with early 
realizations and then second proceeding with a simple Wilcoxon signed-rank test. A 5 percent significance level is 
used in all tests. 
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Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the water traded over the nineteen-year period by sector for both 
annual flow and committed water measures respectively. With respect to Figure 5, we find no 
significant trend in agriculture-to-urban trades, a significant downward trend in within 
agricultural trades, and no significant trend in urban-to-urban trades. In Figure 6, however, where 
committed water is reflected, we find a significant upward trend in agriculture-to-urban trades, 
and no significant trend for within agricultural trades or urban-to-urban trades. As shown, water 
is increasingly moving out of agriculture and into urban uses over time reflecting the widening 
price differentials between urban and agricultural uses (see Figure 1).   
Figure 5 















































   33 
 
Contract Type over Time 
  Figure 7 describes how the total number of transfers moves over time by contractual 
form. We find the following: (1) a significant upward trend in total transactions; (2) a significant 
upward trend in sales transactions; (3) a statistically significant upward trend in multi-year 
leases; and (4) nosignificant trend in one-year leases.
54 This is consistent with the decreasing 
ICRs over time found in Table 3.  
Figure 7 















Analysis of Water Transfers by State 
Table 8 outlines the number of water market transactions by state and by contract form 
from 1987 through 2005.  Colorado dominates in terms of total market transactions, reflecting 
the institutional advantages of the Colorado-Big Thompson Project, where most of the 
transactions are sales. Other active market states are California, Texas, Arizona, Nevada, and 
                                                  
54 All tests for trend are undertaken by differencing the data and then undertaking a simple Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test at a 5 percent significance level.   34 
New Mexico. Within California and Texas short-term leases are the most prevalent contract, but 
multi-year leases and sales are also important. In Arizona, Nevada, and New Mexico, sales are 
common, but, not surprisingly, Montana and Wyoming, the least urban of the 12 western states, 
have the fewest water sales.  
 
Table 8 
Water Transactions by Type and State 
  Number of All 
Transactions  Number of 
Sales 





Arizona  175  118  41  12 
California  481  71  305  60 
Colorado  1,707  1,599  60  31 
Idaho  105  27  74  2 
Montana  23  2  10  11 
New Mexico  118  64  36  15 
Nevada  126  112  4  3 
Oregon  77  12  44  17 
Texas  253  82  119  50 
Utah  75  56  15  3 
Washington  45  16  24  5 
Wyoming  47  6  39  1 
Total  3,232  2,165  771  210 
 
Table 9 provides a detailed break out of water transfer patterns for agriculture-to-
agriculture, agriculture-to-urban, and urban-to-urban transactions within each of the western 
states.  The table shows the relative percentages of the amounts traded by origination and 
destination classifications for both annual flow and committed measures within the three 
categories.  For example, within Arizona 15 percent of the annual flow of water transferred was 
in agriculture-to-urban trades, while 46 percent and 39 percent were part of agriculture-to-
agriculture and urban-to-urban trades, respectively.  Using the committed water measure, 31 
percent of Arizona’s traded water was part of agricultural-to-urban trades, 37 percent in 
agriculture-to-agriculture trades, and 32 percent in urban-to-urban transfers. By either measure, 
within-sector trades clearly are the most common type of transaction in Arizona.    35 
Using the annual flow measure, more water is traded within these three categories in 
Arizona than in any other state. This may reflect Arizona’s reliance on groundwater and the 
clustering of agriculture and urban areas near the same groundwater basins. With respect to the 
committed measure, however, Texas trades the most water. While in most states, the total 
committed water is usually double or triple the total annual flow, in Texas the total committed is 
almost 15 times greater, reflecting the importance of sales and multi-year leases in that state for 
moving most water. In Texas, the establishment of the Edwards Aquifer Authority in 1993 
created an opportunity for urban interests, particularly in the San Antonio area to purchase long-
term rights to water (Glennon, 2002).  
Table 9 





















Urban  (million af) 
AZ  15%  46%  39%  8.34  31%  37%  32%  21.72 
CA  41%  32%  27%  5.04  37%  32%  31%  12.60 
CO  51%  29%  20%  0.59  75%  8%  17%  5.88 
ID  39%  55%  6%  1.59  29%  67%  5%  2.36 
MT  55%  45%  0%  0.02  95%  5%  0%  0.22 
NM  15%  78%  7%  0.10  36%  55%  10%  0.91 
NV  84%  0%  16%  0.22  72%  0%  28%  2.39 
OR  0%  100%  0%  0.10  0%  100%  0%  0.29 
TX  48%  15%  37%  1.75  50%  3%  47%  25.30 
UT  38%  32%  29%  0.31  53%  3%  44%  4.05 
WA  49%  36%  15%  0.16  79%  3%  18%  1.93 
WY  37%  63%  0%  0.10  38%  62%  0%  0.41 
 
Aside from Arizona and Texas, California accounts for the next largest amount of water 
marketed in these categories. California has a broad range of transactions with agriculture-to-
urban trades the largest activity. This situation reflects the efforts of Los Angeles and San Diego, 
especially through the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, to secure agricultural   36 
water to meet growing urban demand. Colorado is heavily dominated by agriculture-to-urban 
trades, but the overall amounts are less than in Arizona, California, or Texas. Additionally, even 
though the amounts are smaller, agriculture-to-urban trades are important in Montana, Nevada, 
Utah, and Washington, whereas agriculture-to-agriculture trades are most important in Idaho, 
Oregon, and Wyoming.  
Table 10 
Relative Percentage of State to each Classification’s Total Transfer Amount 
   Annual Flow      Committed  
  
Ag-to-
Urban  Ag-to-Ag 
Urban-to-
Urban    
Ag-to-
Urban  Ag-to-Ag 
Urban-to-
Urban 
AZ  20%  53%  58%    19%  49%  26% 
CA  45%  23%  24%    13%  25%  14% 
CO  5%  2%  2%    13%  3%  4% 
ID  10%  12%  2%    2%  10%  0% 
MT  0%  0%  0%    1%  0%  0% 
NM  0%  1%  0%    1%  3%  0% 
NV  3%  0%  1%    5%  0%  3% 
OR  0%  1%  0%    0%  2%  0% 
TX  13%  4%  12%    36%  5%  44% 
UT  2%  1%  2%    6%  1%  7% 
WA  1%  1%  0%    4%  0%  1% 


















Table 10 provides a cross-state comparison of how much each state contributed to the 
total amount of water transferred in each of the three classifications for both measures. Notice 
that the committed water measure only doubles the annual flow quantity in agriculture-to-
agriculture trades because of the prevalence of short-term leases in agricultural trades, whereas in 
the other classifications the committed measures are almost five times the annual flow quantities. 
With respect to agriculture-to-urban trades, Arizona, California, and Texas lead the way.  When 
using the annual flow measure, California accounts for 45 percent of the water traded, but falls to 
13 percent when using the committed measure, reflecting California’s propensity to engage in 
one-year leases. Conversely, Texas only accounts for 13 percent of the water transferred when   37 
using the annual flow measure but increases to 36 percent when using the committed measure. 
With respect to agriculture-to-agriculture trades, Arizona and California dominate using either 
measure. Finally, Arizona, California, and Texas make up the large majority of urban-to-urban 
trades. Note that when using the annual flow measure, Texas makes up 12 percent of the water 
traded, but increases to 44 percent when the committed measure is used, again reflecting the 
reliance upon sales and long-term leases in the state.  
 
VIII. Concluding Remarks:  
Relative price data reflect the growing pressure to move water from traditional uses in 
agriculture to meet increased urban demand.  This paper has presented a new data set that 
documents the growth of water trading between 1987 and 2005 for 12 western states in response 
to shifting demand. Data for the analysis comes from the Water Strategist, a monthly publication 
that details transactions, litigation, legislation, and other water market activities in the West.  The 
data reveal a number of important features regarding water market development.  
First, the data confirm the widely held belief that prices are higher for agriculture-to-
urban trades versus within-agriculture trades, in part, reflecting the differences in marginal 
values between the two uses.  Not only are prices higher for urban use, but they are growing 
relative to agricultural use over time. Presently, approximately 80 percent of the West’s diverted 
water supply is employed in agriculture, part at least, for comparatively lower use values than in 
urban areas. The economically and statistically significant price differences reported above 
suggests the potential for large economic gains from re-allocating water through a market 
mechanism.  The data reveal that markets are responding. Agriculture is the origin of the   38 
majority of trades, and the number of agriculture-to-urban transactions is rising over time, 
whereas the number of agriculture-to-agriculture transfers shows no such pattern. 
Second, there is a pronounced trend for the acquisition of water for longer periods of 
time, either through multi-year leases or sales of the water right.  Sales are the most often used 
contractual form and the number of sales is increasing over time.  The number of multi-year 
leases is increasing over time as well, while the number of one-year leases is not growing.  This 
trend is likely due in part to the security of water supplies long-term contracts provide. Buyers 
are willing to pay a premium for water rights.    
Third, the growing importance of sales and multi-year leases in water transactions 
underscores the need to consider the amounts of water obligated over time, rather than 
examining only annual flows in assessing the quantities of water traded as is commonly done in 
the literature.  Considering committed water, we find that more water is transferred and the 
direction of trading is very different than if the focus is on annual flows. While the latter suggests 
most water is transferred within agriculture, the committed variable reveals that more is 
transferred from agriculture-to-urban and through urban-to-urban trades. This difference arises 
because most agriculture-to-agriculture transfers are through one-year leases whereas 
agriculture-to-urban and urban-to-urban transfers are primarily through sales and multi-year 
leases.   
Finally, the data reveal considerable differences in water trading across the states. Some 
of this pattern is due to differences in water supply and demand characteristics. The states with 
the most rapidly growing urban populations tend to exhibit the largest number and greatest 
amounts of water in agriculture-to-urban transactions, and the states with the smallest urban 
growth have the lowest amounts of water traded. We have noted, however, that water rights are   39 
less secure than for other assets and that, because of the interconnected nature of water use and 
trading among parties, each state has a regulatory structure to review and approve market 
transactions, especially those that involve changes in the nature, timing, and location of use, as is 
the case for most agriculture-to-urban transfers.  The nature of property rights to water and the 
regulatory review process varies across the states.  Accordingly, some of the interstate 
differences in observed water transactions are due to differences in transaction costs associated 
with varying property rights and regulatory requirements. Identifying and quantifying those 
factors is an important next step in analyzing the development of water markets in the West.    40 
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